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NO-STRIKE CLAUSES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Frank H. Stewart* 
" ••• About all an employer can get in exchange for his commit-
ments in a collective agreement is continued production - no work 
stoppages for the life of the agreement. Most employers assume that 
they don't get even this unless the union signs a no-strike pledge and 
promises that the union officials will take action against wild-cat 
strikes and work stoppages. Of course, unions say that employers 
get a supply of labor in exchange for their concessions in collective 
agreements. But employers get no more labor now than they did 
before unions existed • ••• " - Charles 0. Gregoryl 
ONE consideration will support several promises.2 A promisor may extract more than one promise in return for his single 
undertaking to do - or not to do. It depends upon his bargaining 
power. His single undertaking may be so valuable that several 
promises are necessary to induce him to act, or not to act. He is 
privileged to hold out for the best deal. The law does not examine 
his motives or reduce his demands. And from this arises the com-
mon-law principle that one consideration may support several 
promises. 
This principle is sharply illustrated in the modem collective 
bargaining agreement. All but one of its typical provisions run 
from the employer to the union. The one affirmative obligation 
which flows from the union to the employer is the no-strike pledge. 
At one time collective bargaining agreements were unenforceable 
because they imposed no mutuality of obligation.3 The employer 
promised everything; nothing came back in return. Mutuality is 
now supplied by the no-strike clause. This one promise from the 
union supplies the consideration for all the others. 
Although the common-law analogy sharpens the importance of 
the no-strike clause, it is legally imperfect. Collective bargaining 
• Associate, Taft, Stettinius &: Hollister, Cincinnati, Ohio.-Ed. 
1 Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope, 1949 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 3, 12. 
2 RFsrATEMENT, CONTRAcrs § 83 (1932), 
8 Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARv. L. REv. 171, 199-201 (1936). 
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agreements are not made at common-law bargaining tables. If 
they were, either party dissatisfied with the proposed bargain could 
decline and walk away. These agreements are made in the context 
of legislation making bargaining mandatory.4 And, although this 
legislation says neither bargainer need accept a proposal or make 
a concession,5 it is administered by an agency whose regulation of 
the bargaining may control the contents of the bargain.6 
But from a practical standpoint, the analogy is accurate to a 
fault. The employer, like his common-law counterpart, ap-
proaches the bargaining table with an estimate of what the pro-
posed bargain will cost. He cannot grant a wage increase, or a 
pension arrangement, or any other exaction if he cannot pay the 
bill. He cannot pay the bill if he cannot operate, and therefore 
continued operation is central to his thinking. This may be an 
automatic - and unwarranted - assumption, but it is an essential 
one. The no-strike clause is how the employer secures this result 
from a labor organization. For these reasons, employers insist on 
inclusion of these clauses,7 and for these reasons employers take 
strikes to get them. 
In giving up the right to strike for a time, a labor organization 
releases its strongest weapon. Sometimes it wishes it hadn't. In 
labor law, as elsewhere, agreements are broken. Expediency of 
the moment then gives the lie to promises of unswerving rectitude. 
The strike may be openly sponsored, or it may be the work of the 
capricious few, for whom the contracting union has no public 
sentiment but grave disapproval. In either event, the result to the 
employer is the same - the freedom from work stoppages is over. 
I. 
A strike in breach of contract irreparably harms the employer. 
Orders are lost. Customers transfer their favor to employers who 
4 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a)(5), (b)(3) (1958). 
5 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1958), says that the obligation to bargain in 
good faith does not "compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession .•. .'' 
6 See Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. 
REv. 1057, 1078-86 (1958). 
7 Insistence on a no-strike clause is not a refusal to bargain. NLRB v. United Clay 
Mines Corp., 219 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955). This article treats certain aspects of the law of 
no-strike clauses in the federal courts. While it does not make policy suggestions, it must be 
obvious that no-strike clauses are of little value unless they are enforced. Weak and 
vacillating policies toward strikes in breach of contract invite their repetition; firm policies 
lessen their incidence. These policy considerations are well set forth in Mangum, Taming 
Wildcat Strikes, Harv. Bus. Rev., March-April 1960, p. 88. For a perceptive analysis, see 
SLICIITER, HEALY 8: LIVERNASH, THE IMPAcr OF CoLI.ECnVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 
663-91 (1960). 
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meet deadlines. The discharge of strike leaders does not end the 
strike; at best, it stops future efforts. A damage action, tried years 
later to the vagaries of a jury, is small recompense to the employer 
denied business because he cannot deliver. Equitable relief is not 
only the most appropriate remedy, but also the only effective one. 
The order of the court8 compelling the union to refrain from 
engaging in a work stoppage in breach of contract has, as a prac-
tical matter, the effect of immediately ending the strike. The 
proposition is easy to state; it is not quite so simple to apply. Be-
fore considering the possibility of equitable relief in the federal 
courts, the theory of federal pre-emption must be disposed of. 
A. 
The doctrine of federal pre-emption states that activity in 
interstate commerce, arguably protected or prohibited by the Taft-
Hartley Act, must first be ruled on by the National Labor Relations 
Board. All other forums must stay their hands until the Board 
rules on its jurisdiction to take the case, and, generally, on the 
merits of the case itself. The ramifications of this doctrine are 
exceedingly wide. It is a vineyard tilled well and often by others.9 
For this purpose it is enough that the tangled skein of cases arising 
from federal pre-emption have little application.10 
Federal pre-emption appears when state courts or boards try to 
rule on behavior governed by federal statute. Then the NLRB 
and not the state has first authority to rule on the activity. But a 
s Orders in equity against strikes run to the union, preventing it from concerted action 
in publicizing, organizing, or otherwise supervising the work stoppage; they generally con-
tain mandatory provisions requiring the union to take affirmative action, rescinding pre-
vious orders, etc. See the order in the national steel strike in 1959, United States v. United 
Steelworkers, 178 F. Supp. 297, 297-98 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 271 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), a/f'd 361 
U.S. 39 (1959), 58 M1CH. L. REv. 595 (1960). Such an order does not violate the involuntary 
servitude prohibition in amendment XIII of the Constitution. See General Elec. Co. v. 
International Union, UAW-CIO, 93 Ohio App. 139, 108 N.E.2d 211 (1952), appeal dis-
missed, 158 Ohio St. 555, 110 N.E.2d 424 (1953). 
9 The best of all treatments is, in my opinion, Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, 
and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 6, 269 (1959). The 
important developments since Professor Meltzer's article are analyzed in Gregory, Federal 
or State Control of Concerted Union Activities, 46 VA. L. REv. 539 (1960). 
10 Of course, I have oversimplified. See the basic analysis in Dunau, Contractual Pro-
hibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional Problems, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 52 (1957), 
and Professor Meltzer's realistic appraisal at 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 269 (1959). For differing 
aspects of the problem, see Notes, 69 YALE L.J. 309 (1959), and 69 HAR.v. L. REv. 725 (1956). 
Yet the net conclusion of all this scholarship is that the courts, and not the NLRB, are 
most competent to deal with a violation of contract, especially one like the no-strike clause 
that goes to the heart of the agreement. Federal courts are decidedly chilly to claims of 
NLRB pre-emption of their own power to adjudicate contract violations. See Lodge 12, 
1AM v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958). 
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breach of contract is of no concern to the Board. In the same statute 
which enlarged the NLRB and its activities, Congress gave federal 
courts authority to hear and decide cases arising from breach of 
labor agreements.11 To facilitate these suits Congress removed the 
usual requirements of diversity of citizenship and amount in con-
troversy. Labor agreements were for the courts; unfair labor 
practices for the Board. For this reason Congress rejected a pro-
posal to make breach of the collective bargaining agreement an 
unfair labor practice: "Once parties have made a collective bar-
gaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be left 
to the usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor 
Relations Board."12 The "usual processes of the law" certainly 
include equitable relief, unless otherwise prohibited. Here, of 
course, the major bar to equitable relief in the federal courts is the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act.13 
B. 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed by Congress to eliminate 
federal equity power in organizational and bargaining strikes.14 
The force of these strikes depends on growing economic and 
psychological momentum. An injunction snaps this force. The 
injunction is especially effective when the judge is receptive to 
the employer's theories of criminal conspiracy, and before 1932 
federal judges were very receptive indeed. They, in effect, wrote 
labor policy through ex parte orders.11s Congress concluded that the 
ease with which employers obtained injunctions from friendly 
judges gave them an unfair advantage in defeating organization 
or in rejecting bargaining demands. Therefore Congress removed 
the advantage. It did so in very broad language. Hereafter no 
"court of the United States"16 could issue restraining orders or 
11 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958). 
12 H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947); 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
LABoR•MANAGEMENT R.Er..ATIONS Am: 546 (1948) [hereinafter cited LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
The Board honors this direction. It has repeatedly said it will not adjudicate contract 
violations. United Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955). The rejected proposal would also 
have made it an unfair labor practice to refuse to submit an arbitrable issue to arbitration. 
H.R. REP. No. 510, supra at 42; I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 546. The undesirability of bringing 
agreements to arbitrate under the Board's jurisdiction was spelled out in 61 Stat. 139-40 
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 154 (1958): "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize 
the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for 
economic analysis." 
13 47 Stat. 70-73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958). 
14 See GREGORY, LABOR AND TIIE LAW 455 (2d rev. ed. 1958). 
15 See Note, Accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to Other Federal Statutes, 
72 HARv. L. REv. 354, 355-56 (1958). 
16 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U .S.C. § 101 (1958). 
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injunctions in a "labor dispute." The labor disputes insulated 
from federal equity power included "any controversy concerning 
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association 
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, 
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment . 
• • .''17 Congress wanted unions to come to the bargaining table 
freed of equitable restraints. What then happened at the table was 
the concern of the parties who sat at it. In 1932, Congress had no 
further interest. 
The history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in debates and reports 
shows legislative desire to allow unions to bargain without hin-
drance from federal courts. The House Report said the object 
of the bill was to "protect, first, the right of free association, and, 
second, the right to advance the lawful object of the association.''18 
Similarly, the Senate: "A single laborer, standing alone, confronted 
with such far-reaching, overwhelming concentration of employer 
power, is absolutely helpless to negotiate or to assert any influence 
over the fixing of his wages or the hours and conditions of labor. "19 
These statements were mirrored in the declaration of policy which 
opens the Norris-LaGuardia Act. "[U]nder prevailing economic 
conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for 
owners of property ... the individual unorganized worker is com-
monly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract ... it is neces-
sary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the 
terms and conditions of his employment .... "20 This reads like a 
faded daguerreotype today. The literature accompanying Norris-
LaGuardia with its inflamed pamphleteer style is hardly in tune 
·with the "economic conditions" that prevail today. The labor 
organizations that faced Senator McClellan are not the fledglings 
of whom Congress was so solicitous in 1932. 
The 1932 Congress immunized unions from equitable remedies 
to give them the power to extract an agreement in ·writing from the 
employer. Congress said employer power was largely created by 
governmental action; governmental action must even the odds for 
the countervailing power. This it did. It went no further. It did 
not intend to free unions from the one effective remedy after agree-
17 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (c) (1958). 
18 H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1932). The same report refers to organi-
zational efforts to obtain favorable conditions. Id. at 9. 
111 S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 9 (1932). (Emphasis added.) 
20 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958). (Emphasis added.) 
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ment was reached.21 Indeed, in 1932 there were few labor agree-
ments to breach. Even the most random thought shows a vast 
difference between protecting an organization from judicial inter-
ference to enhance its bargaining power and permitting that or-
ganization effectively to breach the agreement once reached.22 
Courts have nonetheless so read N orris-LaGuardia.23 I think they 
are mistaken, because I do not believe strikes in breach of contract 
are labor disputes as written in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.24 It 
is incongruous that legislation designed to equip unions with 
bargaining power should free them to breach an agreement reached 
by virtue of the same legislation. Of course, it would be foolish to 
deny that a literal reading of the Norris-LaGuardia Act refutes my 
definition of a labor dispute. But the Norris-LaGuardia Act has 
seldom been read literally. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
releaxed its bans when it has divined a subsequent - and over-
riding - policy. Professor Smith has truthfully remarked the act 
"could be profitably re-examined in light of the fairly numerous 
exceptions which the courts have engrafted upon it."25 
21 Perhaps I read too much into congressional silence. Those who opposed Norris-
LaGuardia urged that its provisions would prevent injunctions for breach of contract. S. 
REP. No. 163, supra note 19, at 9. The majority said nothing about it. 
22 See GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 455-56. 
23 Before Taft-Hartley: Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939). After Taft-
Hartley: W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954). 
24 The idea is hardly original with me. See, e.g., Farrand Optical Co., Inc. v. Local 
475, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 143 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Mountain States Div. 
17, Communications Workers v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 F. Supp. 397 (D. Colo. 
1948); Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH. L. REv. 635, 645 (1959). 
25 Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. REv. 
195, 251 n.203 (1960). E.g., the Supreme Court has allowed an injunction against a rail-
road which refused to bargain with the certified representative of its employees; Norris-
LaGuardia was held inapplicable on policy grounds and no other, for the Railway Labor 
Act could not "be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more general provisions of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act." Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n 40, Ry. Employees Dep't, 300 U.S. 
515, 563 (1937). Moreover, federal courts have jurisdiction to grant injunctions to Negro 
petitioners seeking nondiscriminatory representation by their unions. The Court could 
hardly be more emphatic. "If .•• there remains any illusion that under the Norris• 
LaGuardia Act the federal courts are powerless to enforce these rights, we dispel it now." 
Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 240 (1949); accord, Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); cf. Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 
350 U.S. 892 (1955) (same result under NLRA). Recently the Court authorized an in-
junction against a union which strikes in violation of the compulsory arbitration provi• 
sions of the RLA. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 
30 (1957). The Court assumed that read literally Norris-LaGuardia would bar equitable 
relief, but the result was justified with the statement that Norris-LaGuardia and the RLA 
must be accommodated "so that the obvious purpose in the enactment of each is preserved." 
Id. at 40. See generally Comment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the Status Quo in 
Railway Labor Disputes, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 381 (1960). 
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C. 
But Congress in 1935 apparently thought its predecessor in 
1932 had not done enough to even the scales of economic power 
between organized labor and organized business. In 1932 it 
denied the federal judiciary the power to supervise labor's strongest 
bargaining weapon; in 1935 Congress entered the bargaining 
arena, apparently forever, by requiring the employer to bargain 
with a properly selected union.26 The rest is familiar history. 
The negative protection of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the 
affirmative requirements of the Wagner Act swelled the power of 
organized labor. Major industries recognized union representa-
tion - sometimes after a peaceable election, sometimes after violent 
upheavals. And the collective bargaining agreement became a 
common item instead of a legal freak. 
Many in the Congress and elsewhere thought the objectives of 
1932 and 1935 in equalizing power had outreached themselves. 
After World War II it was a trifle fatuous to view unions as 
creatures of underprivilege. The stereotype had outlived its 
political use. A rash of nation-wide strikes in 1946 and post-war 
political changes which sent conservatives back to Washington in 
recognizable numbers brought matters to a head. Congress de-
cided to examine the power relationships it created in 1932 and 
1935. It did so by amending the Wagner Act; these amendments 
were embodied in the Taft-Hartley Act.27 
One of Congress' principal concerns was to impose equal re-
sponsibility on both parties to a labor agreement. Employers had 
always been suable for their breach, but it was difficult to sue 
unions because the common law of many states required that, in 
order to sue an unincorporated association, the plaintiff had to 
serve each and every member - a virtually impossible task.28 
Another barrier, in the federal courts, was the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act. The Third Circuit, in Wilson & Co. v. Birl,29 said the Norris-
LaGuardia Act prevented federal courts from issuing injunctions 
to remedy breach of no-strike clauses. The Senate Report spoke 
disapprovingly of this reading of the 1932 act which "insulated 
labor unions, in the field of injunctions, against liability for 
26 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8 (5), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 
29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1958). 
27 61 Stat. 136-59 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958). 
28 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947); 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 421. 
29105 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939). 
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breach of contract.''30 After all, the major "advantage which an 
employer can reasonably expect from a collective bargaining agree-
ment is assurance of uninterrupted operation. . . .''31 Therefore, 
in section 301 of Taft-Hartley, Congress allowed federal district 
courts to hear "suits for violation of contracts between an employer 
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry 
affecting commerce. . . ."32 This disarmingly simple language 
bore a marked resemblance to its 1946 predecessor in the Case bill, 
which President Truman vetoed on the ground that it "largely 
repeals the Norris-LaGuardia Act and changes a long-established 
Congressional policy. "33 
Read alone, 301 means just what it says - suits may be brought 
to enforce labor agreements in federal courts. Federal courts may 
hear these suits and grant whatever relief prayed for seems proper. 
Since "suits" encompasses legal or equitable proceedings, the 
federal courts should be able to issue injunctions, or to award 
damages, or both. 
Of course, it is not that easy. Norris-LaGuardia remains on 
the books. Moreover, the NLRB is expressly authorized by the 
Taft-Hartley amendments to section 10 of the NLRA34 to seek 
injunctions in federal district courts for various unfair labor 
practices. Do these considerations mean 301 was restricted to 
damage actions? The Supreme Court said "no" in Textile 
Workers v. Lincoln Mills.35 
The Court was there faced with a union's request for equitable 
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate, certainly a Norris-
30 S. REP. No. 105, supra note 28, at 17; 1 LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY 423. 
31 s. REP. No. 105, supra note 28, at 16; 1 LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY 422. 
32 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958). 
33 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 512 (1957) (dissenting 
opinion). 
34 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160 (j), (l) (1958). The House counterpart of § 301 
removed the prohibitions of Norris-LaGuardia in suits involving breach of a labor agree-
ment. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1947); 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 222. The final 
bill removed only the Norris-LaGuardia concepts of agency, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 160 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 510, supra note 12, at 66; I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 570. Any 
negative inference that Congress thereby intended Norris-LaGuardia to remain in full 
force and effect in § 301 actions is untenable, for such an inference would prove Lincoln 
Mills was wrongly decided. Note also that LMRA § 208 (b), 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 178 (b) (1958), specifically makes Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable to national emergency 
strikes. 
35 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The decision inspired a great deal of writing. The legislative 
background is exhaustively treated in Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the 
Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1957). Professor Feinsinger 
took a decidedly pessimistic view in Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in 
Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REv. 1261 (1957). The best is still Professor Bunn's clear 
and sensible analysis in Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction To Enforce Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements, 43 VA. L. REv. 1247 (1957). 
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LaGuardia labor dispute; it granted the request. The Court found 
the legislative history of 301, though cloudy and confusing,36 
conveyed one dominant idea: Congress wanted labor agreements 
as enforceable against unions in the courts as they always had been 
against employers. It did so in a grant of general jurisdiction to 
the federal courts, which were in tum authorized to weave a 
federal substantive law of labor agreements. Equitable relief was 
quite proper. Hadn't Representative Barden said the House 
equivalent to 301 allowed damage actions and "other remedial 
proceedings, both legal and equitable, as might be appropriate 
under the circumstances .... "?37 
Norris-LaGuardia was no problem. "The failure to arbitrate 
was not a part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was 
aimed.''38 But Congress had not discussed enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate in 1947; it spoke specifically of no-strike clauses 
and generally of enforcing labor agreements. Again, no problem. 
The agreement to arbitrate is "the quid pro quo for an agreement 
not to strike."89 Since Congress wanted no-strike clauses enforced, 
it must have intended equal fare for the concomitant pledge. And 
then, at the end of a very artful opinion, the Court iced the cake: 
it saw "no justification in policy for restricting section 301 (a) to 
d • "40 amage smts .... 
II. 
Congress in 1947 invited employers to enforce no-strike clauses 
in the federal courts. Lincoln Mills said arbitration, the natural 
correlative of the no-strike clause, could be enforced by federal 
equity powers. Since equity could bind the correlative, could it 
bind the first principle? It could in the Tenth Circuit;41 it could 
not in the Second.42 
In the Tenth Circuit the Teamsters violated their agreement 
not to strike against the Yellow Transit Company. In the lower 
88 9ll CoNG. REc. ll656-57 (1947), cited in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 
U.S. 448,456 (1957). 
87Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). 
88 Id. at 458. 
39 Id. at 455. 
40 Id. at 458. {Emphasis added.) 
41 Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.), 
cert. granted, 364 U.S. 931 (1960). 
42 A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 
U.S. 9ll2 (1958), 56 MICH. L. REv. 1205 (1958). Professor Cox observes that the denial of 
certiorari in the Bull case is of even less than usual significance because of the Court's 
strong policy of refusing to review interlocutory orders. Cox, Current Problems in the 
Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RoCK.Y MT. L. REv. 247, 253 n.38 (1958). 
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court the employer asked for, and got, an order restraining the 
strike. The Tenth Circuit held it was properly issued. There 
were several ways for the court to read section 301 with the 
N orris-LaGuardia Act: 
I. A breach of contract is not the type of labor dispute 
the 1932 Congress had in mind. Norris-LaGuardia does not 
apply. 
2. A strike is a strike. By definition it is a labor dispute. 
Its origin makes no difference. Norris-LaGuardia prohibits 
an equitable order. 
3. Section 301 is a grant of general jurisdiction. The 
sweeping prohibitions of Norris-LaGuardia cannot hamper 
the aims of equal enforceability 301 was intended to en-
courage. Where the two conflict 301 prevails.43 
The Tenth Circuit favored the last view. It assumed 301 does not 
restore unlimited equity powers to the federal courts where the 
suit involves an employer and a labor organization.44 The court 
saw a vital difference in a negative order enjoining strikes to 
achieve a labor agreement and an affirmative decree making unions 
honor their agreements. 
"It is one thing to utilize an injunctive decree for the 
negative purpose of interfering with full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization and designation of representatives to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of employment. It is 
quite another to utilize the judicial processes to preserve and 
vouchsafe the fruits of a bargain which the parties have freely 
arrived at through the exercise of collective bargaining 
rights."45 
43 See Comment, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 496, 497 (1958). 
44 282 F.2d at 349. 
45 Id. at 349-50. 
On December 2, 1960 the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky issued a 
preliminary injunction enjoining a slowdown in breach of a clause prohibiting "interrup• 
tion or impeding of work, work stoppage, strike. . . ." American Radiator &: Standard 
Sanitary Corp. v. International Molders &: Foundry Workers, Civil No. 4051, W.D. Ky., 
Dec. 2, 1960. In issuing the preliminary injunction the court specifically found in its 
conclusions of law that the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were "inapplicable to 
this suit under Section 301 [of the LMRA] .•. for violation of a contract between an 
employer and a labor organization ... to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining 
agreement through injunctive process." Accord, American Chain &: Cable Co. v. United 
Steelworkers, Civil No. 60-793, W.D. Pa., Dec. 12, 1960; contra, Baltimore Contractors, Inc. 
v. Carpenters' District Council, 188 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. La. 1960). The district court in the 
American-Standard case also cited the defendant unions for civil contempt when they 
refused to abide by the preliminary injunction and end the slowdown. American Radiator 
&: Standard Sanitary Corp. v. International Molders &: Foundry Workers, Civil No. 4051, 
W.D. Ky., Dec. 23, 1960. 
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The result is correct. It should be sustained by the Supreme 
Court. If, as the Supreme Court believes, the no-strike clause is 
the quid pro quo for an agreement to arbitrate - and both were 
present in Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 
it is obvious "that the no-strike clause is no real 'quid pro quo' for 
an arbitration provision unless it is specifically enforceable by the 
employer, just as the arbitration clause is specifically enforceable 
by the union .... "46 The result is consonant with Lincoln Mills; 
it does no violence to the principles of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 
Norris-LaGuardia was devised to prevent judges from reading their 
own social and economic views into labor law. A federal judge 
has no carte blanche when asked to enjoin a breach of a labor agree-
ment. He reads the agreement, he decides if the breach is material, 
and, perhaps, if it is justified by a prior breach. Then he decides 
if the breach warrants relief in equity. He is confined to enforcing 
a voluntary undertaking. He is restricted to what the litigants have 
written. His opinions on the wisdom of the agreement are of no 
importance. 
I believe a flat holding that breach of contract is not a Norris-
LaGuardia labor dispute would sustain Yellow Transit but would 
provide a far cleaner reading of the exact limits of 301 in relation 
to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Perhaps this avenue is unlikely. 
The view prevails that collective bargaining agreements are unique 
commitments that have no relationship to common law contracts. 
The Supreme Court finds this view to its liking.47 And the 
flexible attitude advanced by the Tenth Circuit gives courts wide 
latitude in laying down a federal common law of labor agreements. 
And this is, after all, the net result of Lincoln Mills. 
Yellow Transit applies the principles of equity announced by 
Professor Chafee.48 It was his view that it was a mistake to read 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act as depriving federal courts of "power" 
to issue equitable orders. All courts have "power" when they 
acquire jurisdiction over the person and over the subject matter. 
Courts may, of course, be reversed; but on appeal the issue is 
whether the issuance of the equity order was ·wrong - not whether 
Others agree that no-strike clauses should be specifically enforced in the federal courts. 
GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 455-56; Cox, supra note 42, at 252-56; Hays, The 
Supreme Court and Labor Law, October Term, 1959, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 901, 918 (1960); 
Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 496,506 (1958). 
40 Hays, supra note 45, at 918. 
41 lbid. 
48 CHAFEE, SOllrE PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 364-80 (1950). 
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the order was void ab initio due to lack of jurisdiction. In short, 
Norris-LaGuardia merely lays down "right principles for [the 
courts'] decision."49 The act does not withdraw the power to hear 
and determine disputes and, if necessary, to remedy them with 
orders in equity. "Right principles for decision" require equal 
enforcement of the obligations accepted. The Norris-LaGuardia 
Act's emphasis on voluntary settlement of labor disputes enforces 
this reasoning. True, this application of Chafee's view is foreign 
to its origin, but the analysis loses none of its edge because it cuts 
both ways. Professor Chafee would be the first to concede this -
perhaps wryly. 
The Eastern District of New York ventured a similar analysis 
in A.H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Union50 only to be reversed in the 
Second Circuit.51 That court reconciled denial of an injunction 
with Lincoln Mills in this fashion. Lincoln Mills refused to 
arbitrate; the Bull Steamship Company faced a strike. The circuit 
said that the refusal to arbitrate was not conduct protected by 
N orris-LaGuardia; a strike was. The flaw in this reasoning is that 
Lincoln Mills said the refusal to arbitrate was also a Norris-
LaGuardia labor dispute.112 Clearly an employer's refusal to 
arbitrate is as much a dispute between employers and employees as 
a strike. 
Although the Second Circuit recognized that Norris-LaGuardia 
openly encouraged arbitration,113 it did not pursue this concept to 
its end. For years federal courts and the NLRB have held that a 
promise to arbitrate all disputes between an employer and a union 
is an implied no-strike clause.54 Suppose a union which signed a 
clause like this refused to arbitrate a dispute, but struck instead. 
Any district court in the Second Circuit would be compelled by 
Lincoln Mills to order the union to arbitrate. Yet that same court, 
under Bull, would be powerless to enjoin the strike in direct breach 
of a promise it must specifically enforce - an interesting predica-
ment for a court of equity.1111 
49 Id. at 367-68. 
50 155 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), rev'd, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 
355 U.S. 932 (1958). "The Norris-LaGuardia Act circumscribed federal jurisdiction •••• 
The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 conferred such jurisdiction.'' 155 F. Supp. 
at 741. 
111250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). 
52 353 U.S. at 458. 
53 47 Stat. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1958). 
114 See notes 106-15 infra, and accompanying text. 
55 Cf. Johnson & Johnson v. Textile Workers Union, 184 F. Supp. 359 (D.N.J. 1960). 
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The long and the short of it is that the modern labor agreement 
needs equal and dispassionate handling by the federal courts. The 
courts can hardly weave an ingenious pattern of law from 301 when 
it concerns an agreement to arbitrate, yet return to a pristine read-
ing of Norris-LaGuardia when it concerns an agreement not to 
strike. If labor unions can enforce in equity but one of the 
promises that flow to them from the compulsory bargaining process, 
it is exceedingly unfair to deny employers the same treatment for 
the only important promise that runs to them from the union. 
This is really the reasoning underlying Yellow Transit, and here 
it is faultless. It is only what a district court in Washington said 
not long ago: "If that [Lincoln Mills] language means what it 
plainly says, surely simple justice and common fairness would 
dictate that sauce for the goose be such for the gander."56 
III. 
"[T]he agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid 
pro quo for an agreement not to strike,"57 said the Court in Lincoln 
Mills. The Court has repeated this equation.58 It is therefore a 
part of the federal law of collective labor agreements that binds the 
lower federal courts. I mention it again not because I wish to 
cavil with such authority, but because I do not understand what 
the Court means. 
The Court's statement can be taken at least three ways. 
I. In every collective bargaining agreement a no-strike clause 
is expressly agreed to in exchange for a grievance procedure that 
ends in arbitration. 
50American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union, 175 F. Supp. 750, 
754 (W .D. Wash. 1959). One author said that Lincoln Mills required no such reading, 
because substantial damages deterred unions from violating no-strike clauses, while dam-
ages for an employer's refusal to arbitrate afford the union only nominal relief. Note, 
Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role of Norris-La-
Guardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 99 (1960). This reasoning was based on "a proper adjustment 
to the differences in the tactical positions of management and labor when either refuses to 
arbitrate." Id. at 99. The author misconceives the tactical positions. Substantial damages 
do not deter wildcat strikes; indeed, a union may well risk a damage action tried years 
later for the moment's advantage. The author's misconception lies deeper, for he writes 
of judicial relief purely from the standpoint of remedy for but one side to a collective 
agreement. I doubt if he would agree to the following statement: "Injunctive relief against 
a union's refusal to live up to the no-strike clause is necessary because a damage action 
for breach of the promise to submit disputes to arbitration would furnish the employer 
only nominal relief. But when the employer refuses to arbitrate, the prospect of substan-
tial damages makes the damage award a substantial deterrent." Yet it is the corollary of 
what he has said - from another standpoint. 
57 353 U.S. at 455. 
58 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960). 
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This interpretation assumes that collective bargaining is a neat 
and orderly affair. It suggests a quiet room where two negotiators 
tick off their proposals one by one, changing, perhaps, the original 
proposal after objections or counter-proposals, and upon agree-
ment passing to the next point. Nothing could be further from 
the fact. Collective bargaining is a show of economic strength, or 
a sideshow, or an arena for bargaining skill of a high order; it is 
seldom, if ever, a precise affair with each proposal dovetailed to its 
counterpart. Rarely are issues so carefully set out that any ob-
server could with certitude say: "If the employer would agree to 
the union's arbitration procedure, the union would agree to the 
employer's no-strike clause and the agreement would be closed." 
An example will do. Suppose the ABC Company and X Union 
have negotiated for a month. They are agreed on wages, hours of 
work, insurance and other fringe benefits. Two issues remain. ABC 
wants a broad prohibition on strikes, slowdown, picketing or any 
other interference with work. In the event of a work stoppage 
ABC wants to retain the unlimited right to discipline any or every 
striker who violates the agreement - the only arbitrable subject 
will be the striker's participation in the wildcat strike. X Union 
has no objection to a no-strike clause, and it does not balk over 
discharge of strikers taking part in a breach of contract, but it 
wants two modifications: ABC must absolve the union of financial 
liability for "unauthorized" strikes, and ABC must submit "any 
dispute" with the union to arbitration before going to court. This 
the employer will not do. Both refuse agreement unless these 
proposals are agreed to. Suddenly ABC offers an extra contribu-
tion to the cost-of-living allowance conditioned on acceptance of 
its no-strike clause alone. X Union drops its arbitration procedure 
and signs the agreement. This no-strike clause is the quid pro quo 
for the arbitration procedure plus the additional money. There 
are many so negotiated. 
The point of this recital is simply to indicate the impossibility 
of stating that one clause in a labor agreement is the quid pro quo 
for any other. This is especially so of the no-strike clause. It is, 
after all, the only decisive promise a union makes an employer. 
True, a union may recede from a bargaining demand, but this is 
hardly a positive undertaking that may be enforced in court. 
Therefore, in a very real sense, the promise not to strike is the quid 
pro quo for every promise running from the employer to the union, 
for it is the only binding commitment the union offers. 
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2. Any union which releases its right to strike for a time needs 
some way to resolve issues for which it would otherwise strike. The 
grievance procedure culminating in arbitration supplies this need. 
Even if one is not the express consideration for the other, the law 
will construe them as concurrent promises. 
This interpretation also dissolves on analysis. A grievance 
procedure is supposed to quickly resolve complaints, generally 
about the way the company runs the plant. But it is one thing to 
say that grievance procedures allow employees to force their em-
ployer to honor his agreement. It is quite another to conclude that 
these procedures are in their daily operation the automatic equiva-
lent of agreements not to strike. If one states the grievance proce-
dure is the inevitable equal of a no-strike clause, one assumes the 
union will strike for each grievable issue. This is ridiculous. Many 
grievances are taken to arbitration for reasons that have nothing 
to do with their merits. Assume the most obvious example - the 
discharge case. Suppose the ABC Company discharges for insub-
ordination an employee ·with seven years' standing. The employee 
has been warned before. True, his work record is good, but ABC 
thinks it can hire another who will do good work with obedience. 
The union leader is caught in a bind. He knows the employee 
richly deserved his fate. Many of his members privately agree. But 
the employee publicly demands a grievance, and the demand is 
hard to refuse. If the steward tells him he deserved the discharge, 
he will be called a pa·wn of the employer; if he fails to press the 
grievance, he is faithless to his stewardship. It is more expedient 
to let the grievant hear the unwelcome news from an arbitrator. 
Why not take it to arbitration? Why not, indeed. 
The grievance is filed; it is denied at all steps of the grievance 
procedure, and it finally goes to arbitration. Whether the arbitra-
tor upholds the discharge or reinstates the employee with or with-
out back pay is neither here nor there. The relevance of this 
grievance is that a strike over it would be unpopular if, in fact, the 
union could call the strike at all. Airing this grievance may release 
tensions, it may be the progressive and enlightened way to do 
things, it may be everything arbitrators say it is. One thing it is 
not - it is not the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike. 
Perhaps the next grievance will be over an issue for which the 
union would gladly strike; only then is the employer's agreement 
to hear the matter and accept an adverse decision fairly the equiva-
lent of the promise not to strike. 
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I realize the agreement to entertain a grievance does not depend 
on the merits of the particular controversy. The promise to hear 
includes the promise to hear foolishness. But it must be obvious 
that the mere presence of an arbitration clause invites its use. A 
union hardly surrenders its only economic weapon in return for a 
promise to let an arbitrator hear a dispute largely created by his 
availability. Unions with experience know their promise not to 
strike will bring a higher price. Moreover, this second reading of 
the Court's language assumes that grievances cannot be settled 
without recourse to arbitration. This, of course, is nonsense. 
Grievances are settled every day without recourse to either a griev-
ance procedure or to arbitration. It may be that in the Court's view 
arbitration is the best way of settling these matters, but it is by no 
means the only way. 
3. Arbitration is conducive to settling industrial disputes; so 
are pledges not to strike. Both are in the national interest; both 
should be encouraged. Since the aim of the no-strike clause and 
the arbitration procedure is to prevent work stoppages, one is 
naturally the corollary of the other. 
This reading has a surface plausibility. It is based upon the 
view that the strike is the union's only economic weapon. When 
it releases the work stoppage for a time, it needs another method 
of making the employer observe the agreement; and arbitration 
is the best way of bringing this about. But here the wide variety 
of no-strike clauses prevents mechanical application of the Court's 
rule. 
A recent survey by the Bureau of National Affairs59 shows that 
some form of no-strike clauses appear in 94 percent of the labor 
agreements reviewed. There are generally two types of clauses: 
(1) those unconditionally banning work stoppages for the life of 
the agreement; (2) those requiring the union to refrain from 
striking only until a condition is fulfilled - such as exhaustion of 
a grievance procedure, deadlock during a wage reopening and so 
on. The absolute ban on strikes appears in 48 percent of the 
agreements reviewed; the conditional bans are provided in 46 per-
cent. 
The survey notes that no-strike clauses are generally paralleled 
not by arbitration promises, but by pledges from employers regard-
ing lockouts. No-lockout pledges appeared in 84 percent of the 
59 47 LAB. REL. REP. 3 (1960). 
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contracts reviewed by the survey. Many of these no-strike clauses 
conform to the Court's desire for an absolute ban on strikes. But 
many are surrounded ·with conditions which must be met before 
a court could enforce it. 
A no-strike clause, like an arbitration procedure, is an element 
of power. It makes the other side honor his agreement. It is valu-
able only as it is enforceable. If it is hedged with restrictions, it is 
more difficult to enforce, and less effective as an enforcing agent. 
It may be a model of draftsmanship, but unless it gets results, it is 
useless. Parties bargain for weapons, not intellectual equiva-
lents. Consider the agreement where the promise to arbitrate is 
exceedingly broad and the no-strike clause is extremely limited. 
For example, Article VIII of the Central States Area Over-the-
Road Motor Freight agreement60 provides that "there shall be no 
strike, lockout, tie-up, or legal proceedings without first using all 
possible means of a settlement, as provided for in this Agreement, 
of any controversy which might arise." There follows a grievance 
procedure with no time limit on its various steps. The second sec-
tion of this grievance machinery says that "in all cases of an un-
authorized strike, slowdown, walkout, or any unauthorized cessa-
tion of work in violation of this Agreement, the Union shall not 
be liable for damages resulting from such unauthorized acts of its 
members." The union in turn promises that it "shall make imme-
diate effort to terminate any strike or stoppage of work which is 
not authorized by it without assuming liability therefor." Twenty-
four hours after a ·wildcat strike begins the employer has an unfet-
tered right to discharge the employees who participated, and the 
employees have no recourse through the grievance machinery. 
A moment's reflection shows that this no-strike clause is hardly 
the equal of the grievance machinery. "Any controversy" between 
the employers and the union may be grieved at any time. The 
grievance procedure may be specifically enforced upon showing 
that a grievance comes within the arbitration pledge. But should 
an employer sue the union for a strike in breach of contract, he 
will immediately be confronted with outward evidence that the 
union never "authorized" the strike. The employer must prove 
that the strike was authorized. A union which has fostered a wild-
cat strike has ample ways of publicly disassociating itself from the 
strike. Astute cross-examination and careful use of the discovery 
procedures can sometimes give the lie to writings, telegrams and 
601 CCH LAB. L. REP. [UNION CoNTRACTS & ARBJ.TMTION] ,r 59,944 (1960). 
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newspaper ads. But these take time - as any union resisting an 
equitable order well knows. Of course, the employer has the right 
to discharge employees who strike in breach of contract. But this 
is negative relief; it is no substitute for judicial action. It is myopic 
to say that the no-strike clause above recited is the equivalent of 
the grievance machinery. 
Consider the reverse. There are grievance procedures that are 
narrower than the accompanying no-strike clause. Suppose the 
agreement provides that any dispute an employee or his representa-
tives may have with the employer may be grieved, but expressly 
exempts arbitration of grievances arising from test work. The 
no-strike clause is all-inclusive. If the Court accepts the Tenth 
Circuit's view of Norris-LaGuardia and takes its own alignment of 
arbitration and no-strike clauses literally, it might refuse to enjoin 
a strike over grievances concerning test work. After all, the no-
strike clause is broader than the arbitration procedure which is 
supposedly its quid pro quo. 
What if the no-strike clause is not accompanied by any arbitra-
tion provisions? A literalistic reading of the Court's observation 
might prevent any equitable enforcement of the no-strike clause. 
This reading would rewrite many no-strike and arbitration clauses 
at the first available moment. If enforcement means revision of 
work stoppage and arbitration clauses to suit the Court's notions 
of 301 policy, the parties may have to decide if they are willing to 
pay the price. It seems incredible that the Court would thrust its 
conception of a desirable labor agreement into a bargaining process 
still free. These results are probably what Justices Brennan and 
Harlan foresaw in their concurring opinion in the three landmark 
arbitration cases: 
"The court makes reference to an arbitration clause being 
the quid pro quo for a no-strike clause. I do not understand 
the court to mean that the application of the principles an-
nounced today depends upon the presence of a no-strike clause 
in the agreement.''61 
But perhaps Mr. Justice Douglas' meaning is just what I have 
suggested: 
"Complete effectuation of the federal policy is achieved 
when the agreement contains both an arbitration provision 
for all unresolved grievances and an absolute prohibition of 
61 363 U.S. at 573. 
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strikes, the arbitration agreement being the 'quid pro quo' for 
the agreement not to strike.''62 
The short answer to all this is that 301 gives jurisdiction to 
entertain "suits for violation of contracts." Congress did not with-
draw from the judicial power agreements which the Supreme 
Court finds distasteful. Congress sets American labor policy, as we 
have been reminded for many years by the Court and the academi-
cians. Congress called for equal enforcement of voluntary agree-
ments. And courts which refuse to enforce those agreements they 
do not feel accomplish a "complete effectuation of the federal 
policy" would bring labor policy full circle with a vengeance. They 
would thus form a labor policy through their equity powers, quite 
as much as in the bad old days before Norris-LaGuardia. 
IV. 
Even if the agreement to arbitrate is not always the agreed-upon 
exchange for the agreement not to strike, the two are intimately 
connected in another fashion. 
A. 
Often a union sued for damages for breach of a no-strike clause 
requests the court to stay63 or dismiss64 the damage action so it may 
arbitrate the issues giving rise to the strike, 611 or of the strike itself. 66 
The reason is no mystery. An arbitrator may be far more 
tolerant of strikes in breach of contract than a court, bound as a 
court is to common law rules of contractual integrity. Courts 
enforce agreements as they are ·written; they cannot map out the 
societal good as freely as many who answer the arbitrator's calling. 
Consider a discharge for leadership of a strike in breach of contract. 
A court, like the NLRB, will consider participation of a union 
officer determinative; 67 an arbitrator's standards are not so strict. 
Some arbitrators say a union leader owes responsibility above and 
62 Id. at 578 n.4. See also Note, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1205 (1958). 
68 E.g., Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 174 F. Supp. 878 (D.N.J. 1959). 
M Brady Transfer&: Storage Co. v. Local 710, Meat Drivers, 22 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 67,121 
(N.D. III. 1952) (alternative motions to dismiss or stay). 
65 Armsttong-Nonvalk Rubber Corp. v. Local 283, United Rubber Workers, 167 F. 
Supp. 817 (D. Conn. 1958), appeal dismissed, 269 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1959) (motion to stay 
pending arbitration of discharge giving rise to strike, and/or of tbe strike itself). 
66 Gay's Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 169 F. Supp. 834 (D. Mass. 
1959). 
67 See United Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 
U.S. 981 (1956); American Gilsonite Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1514 (1958), affd on reconsideration, 
122 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1959). 
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beyond the normal to control the work stoppage. This school rea-
sons that if leaders order their members to return to work, them-
selves setting the example, these stoppages would greatly decrease.68 
Others find this treatment discriminatory.69 They state that a 
union leader is one employee of many who must be punished as 
every other. Arbitrators also use a less rigid standard in appraising 
union responsibility for the strike.70 They are far more niggardly 
in their calculation of damages.71 
In short, the union, like any litigant, seeks the most hospitable 
forum. Employers, too, move for a stay of a damage action pending 
arbitration when it suits their purpose.72 
68 Note, Considerations in Disciplining Employees for Participation in Violations of 
the No-Strike Clause, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 999, 1017-20 (1958). 
69Ibid. 
70 See the discussion in Note, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 908, 913 (1958). 
71 Ibid. See also Regent Quality Furniture, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 553 (Arbitrator Turkus). 
72 Metal Polishers Union v. Rubin, 85 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1949). Prior to General 
Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957), a disagreement had arisen 
in the circuits as to the application of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. ~§ 2-14 
(1958), to collective bargaining agreements. Holding that the act applies: International 
Union, UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 
U.S. 814 (1957); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d 
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General 
Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), afj'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 547 (1957); Tenney 
Eng'r, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (with the proviso that 
the exclusion applied to collective bargaining agreements covering transportation workers). 
Holding that the act does not apply: United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 
241 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 354 U.S. 906 (1957); Lincoln Mills v. Tex-
tile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 448 
(1957); United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954); 
Commercial Packing Co. v. Butchers Union, 35 L.R.R.M. 2142 (S.D. Cal. 1954). The dis-
agreement in the circuit courts stemmed largely from applications by unions to stay 
damage actions for breach of no-strike clauses pending arbitration. Unions sought a stay 
of these damage actions under § 3 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1958), which allows 
a court to "stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement .... " Of course, a condition to any such stay was that 
the issue sought to be arbitrated was referable to arbitration. The circuits split on the 
qualifying phrase of § 1 of the act, 9 U.S.C. § l (1958), which states that the act shall not 
"apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of 
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." This disagreement will probably be 
resolved at some time by the Supreme Court, although it is probably academic in view 
of General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, supra. There the First Circuit, 233 
F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), had held that the Arbitration Act provided the substance for § 301, 
which the First Circuit regarded as exclusively procedural. Harmonizing these two statutes, 
the First Circuit had ordered arbitration. The Supreme Court followed a rather elliptical 
path. It sustained the First Circuit, but declined to rule on the Arbitration Act. "We follow 
in part a different path than the Court of Appeals though we reach the same result." 353 
U.S. at 548. If the issue is squarely presented again to the Court, the Arbitration Act will 
find a powerful opponent in Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who set forth in his dissenting 
opinion in Lincoln Mills the reasons for the act's inapplicability to collective bargaining 
agreements. "When Congress passed legislation to enable arbitration agreements to be 
enforced by the federal courts, it saw fit to exclude this remedy with respect to labor 
contracts." 353 U.S. at 466. 
Whether or not the Arbitration Act does apply to labor agreements really makes little 
difference now, since under Lincoln Mills the federal courts are empowered to fashion 
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B. 
Unions have always been eager to remove breach of a no-strike 
clause from the courts to arbitration. Three decisions in the last 
term of the Supreme Court will encourage their endeavor. A con-
sideration of one will do. In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & 
Gulf Nav. Co.,73 the union tried for nineteen years to restrict by 
contract the employer's right to subcontract work. It failed. One 
day, as in the past, the employer did subcontract some work here-
tofore done by bargaining unit employees. The union filed a 
grievance under a clause that forbade any work stoppage to settle 
disputes, but rather compelled use of the grievance machinery to 
review "differences ... between the Company and the Union or its 
members . . . as to the meaning and application of this Agree-
ment .... "74 The agreement also said that "matters which are 
strictly a function of management shall not be subject to arbitra-
tion under this section."75 The union filed a grievance to protest 
this practice of subcontracting; the employer refused to entertain 
it, and the lower courts held he had a perfect right to. The Su-
preme Court reversed. 
The grievance procedure did not expressly exclude from its 
scope the employer's contracting out of work. The employer's 
practice involved a "difference"; it was certainly a "local trouble 
of any kind" which might be grieved. Any judicial attempt to 
examine the bargaining history of the parties "necessarily compre-
hends the merits," and the meri~ were the arbitrator's preserve 
upon which judges might not poach. Under a grievance procedure 
comprehending broad submissions, only express reservations will 
keep certain issues from its ambit. 
But the startling effect of Warrior is the possible result of the 
arbitration it orders. For nineteen years the Steelworkers Union 
has tried to restrict by contract Warrior's practice of subcontract-
ing work to outside firms.76 It has failed. Now the validity of this 
practice will be decided by an arbitrator, himself a creature of 
contract. The power to decide includes the power to decide both 
federal substantive law of collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, federal courts may 
stay actions under § 301, just as if the Arbitration Act applied. 
73 363 U.S. 574 (1960), 59 MICH. L. REv. 454 (1961). 
74 363 U.S. at 576. 
75lbid. 
76 The lower court considered this of deciding importance. See the decision by Judge 
Tuttle, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 269 F.2d 633, 636-37 (5th Cir. 
1959), affirming 168 F. Supp. 702 (1958). 
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ways, and these powers the Warrior arbitrator will have in full 
measure. He may deny the grievance; he may grant it. If he grants 
it, the full scope of Warrior will be there for all to see. For then 
the union will be awarded a concession by arbitration that it could 
not achieve in nineteen years of negotiation. The award will bind 
the parties until it is explicitly overturned in a future agreement. 
In practical effect, therefore, it amends the agreement.77 By arbi-
tration one party will have been able materially to modify his 
undertaking with the other, and he will have done it through a 
scheme designed to apply the agreement as written. To those who 
still view arbitration as consensual, this is a jarring result indeed. 
As startling as the actual result is the Court's view of the 
arbitral process. I had always supposed that arbitration was a 
relatively inexpensive way for two who disagree to compose their 
differences. The man chosen to do this is confined to the agreement 
which creates his power. His power is considerable. He binds the 
parties with his decision unless he steps completely beyond the 
agreement, or takes a bribe.78 Of course, there are all manner of 
arbitrators. Some are intelligent, some are not. Some confine 
themselves to a careful reading of the agreement which authorizes 
their presence; others summon a higher wisdom to which they 
alone are privy. Some are impartial; others are biased; and yet 
others give truth to the commonly held notion that arbitrators 
split their justice so they will be asked back again. 
Over the years an idea that arbitration is a science approaching 
the oracular has gained wide currency. This image of arbitration 
sees men of learning available to few doling out a justice of awe-
some quality. The image is the creation of men who arbitrate for 
a fee. Of course, it is not strange for a profession to cloak its prac-
tice in mystery so that the herd should approach with reverence. 
Medicine and the law have done this for generations. The practice 
is humbug nonetheless. There are few arbitration cases that could 
not be wisely decided by an intelligent observer who reads the 
agreement with care and listens with attention to the arguments 
77 Most arbitration clauses prohibit the arbitrator from amending or in any way modi-
fying the agreement. One district court, Local 725, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. 
Standard Oil Co., 186 F. Supp. 895 (D.N.D. 1960), read this clause as expressly prohibiting 
the arbitrator from deciding issues completely rejected in negotiations. 
78 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Supp. Page 1960) and § 2711.10 (Page 
1953), which allow vacation of an arbitration award if it was procured by corruption, or 
evident partiality, or misconduct of the hearing, or if the arbitrator exceeded the powers 
granted him. 
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presented to him. Who has not heard arbitrators fulminate at tire-
some length over an issue any sensible person - including a federal 
judge - could dispatch in short order with a little horse sense? Nat-
urally some issues - incentive plans, time-studies, guaranteed an-
nual wage supplements - are technically more demanding than 
others, but the knowledge to decide can be acquired. It is the job 
of any litigant to inform the judge. Nevertheless, the view that 
labor arbitrators are mystagogues is held by many, and among these 
are at least six Justices of the Supreme Court. 
In the view of the Warrior Court, the arbitrator in his wisdom 
"is not confined to the express provisions of the contract."79 Far 
from it. He is to look to "the practices of the industry and the 
shop"80 which are "equally a part of the ... agreement although 
not expressed in it."81 After all, is he not selected because the 
union and management repose "confidence in his knowledge of the 
common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment 
to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the con-
tract ... "?82 And in exercising his personal judgment he must 
consider all manner of things which will be good for the parties -
"the productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the 
morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be height-
ened or diminished."83 Small wonder that one observer, himself 
an arbitrator, finds Mr. Justice Douglas' picture of the arbitration 
process "more like the praise . . . one might hear . . . at a public 
function of an arbitration group" than the "hard, practical day to 
day process of hearing and determining grievances."84 
For better or for worse, Warrior and its companions give the 
broadest possible sweep to arbitration. These principles emerge: 
1. The court determines arbitrability. "[A]rbitration is a 
matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to 
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."85 
2. The court, in making its determination, must read 
the contract from its four corners. "It is confined to ascer-
taining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a 
711 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960). 




84 Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law, October Term, 1959, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 
901, 9!10 (1960). 
85 363 U.S. at 582. 
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claim which on its face is governed by the agreement."86 It 
may not review bargaining history.87 
3. All doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitrability.88 
4. A party asserting non-arbitrability must prove it. He 
does so through: 
(a) an express exclusion of the issue from the grievance 
or arbitration procedures; 
(b) a written collateral agreement excluding the issue 
from arbitration; or 
(c) "most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the 
claim from arbitration .... "89 The evidence showing an issue 
is not arbitrable must be very forceful indeed; Warrior's evi-
dence of nineteen years of demand, refusal and practice was 
not enough. 
Under the impetus of Warrior, an arbitrator asked to determine 
union responsibility for a strike in breach of contract has a wide 
palette of remedies. He may reason that since the union's treasury 
is low, the "morale of the shop" would be disastrously affected by 
an award of money damages to the employer. And of course no 
modern, enlightened employer would decrease morale. He may 
conclude that the discharge of the stewards who led the strike will 
heighten tensions - as discharges always do for a time. Therefore, 
the discharges should be commuted to a layoff. Or if the offending 
stewards are skilled workers, the arbitrator may reason it will take 
weeks to train their replacements. "Productivity" will decrease; 
this is undesirable, a lesser penalty is called for. Or suppose in this 
industry the employer is alone in its policy of discharge and court 
action to redress a breach of contract. Its policies are not "the 
practices of the industry." The arbitrator certainly cannot allow 
one employer to upset a usage others have created over the years. 
All this may seem far-fetched, but it is not impossible. One 
arbitrator has already reasoned that an employer should not be 
awarded damages for strikes in breach of a no-strike clause in order 
86 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960). (Emphasis 
added.) 
87 Ibid. This is indeed a radical departure from the customary principles of contrac-
tual construction. Mr. Justice Brennan may have some qualms about this wholesale ap-
proach. See his concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, in the three landmark 
cases. Id. at 569. 
88 Id. at 568. Where, however, it is clear that the agreement expressly excludes certain 
issues from arbitration, a district court will not order arbitration, Warrior notwithstanding. 
International Molders' Union v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., Civil No. 
3948, W.D. Ky., Feb. 9, 1961. 
89 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960). 
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"to avoid the regeneration of antagonisms that finally have been 
dissipated ... .''90 In place of damages he ordered "full co-operation 
11/ith management in making up the production losses .... "91 Ar-
bitrators so inclined must read Warrior with relish. 
Warrior's effect on bargaining for the next few years is not hard 
to predict. Unions will try to write into labor agreements the 
widest possible arbitration clauses which, above all, give to the 
employer an express right to file grievances against the union. Em-
ployers will try to constrict the scope of arbitration to exclude 
specifically the issues they do not wish reviewed. Unions will strike 
for arbitration clauses which cover the range of their relations 
with capital; employers will do their best to frustrate these strikes. 
In the struggle created by the Court's opinions, unions will exert 
great energy to subject breach of a no-strike clause to the arbitral 
process. Nowhere 11/ill they encounter more resistance. 
C. 
Federal courts have been decidedly cool to suggestions that they 
relinquish to arbitrators the power to judge breach of a no-strike 
clause. Unions will no doubt argue that Warrior has made this 
attitude obsolete. If the Supreme Court holds that a no-strike 
clause may be specifically enforced in the federal courts, this atti-
tude will take on added importance. 
All federal cases granting or denying stay of court action require 
construction of the contract under which arbitration is requested. 
But the differing results in the circuits cannot be dismissed as mere 
disagreements on the meaning of language; courts have arrived at 
opposite results when presented 11/ith virtually identical wording. 
For the reader's ease I have arranged the cases according to their 
theories. 
I. A strike in breach of contract is not a" grievance" as that word 
is commonly used. This view was most positively articulated by 
the Sixth Circuit.92 That court has since reiterated this view.93 
The Fourth Circuit94 and probably the Fifth agree.95 These courts 
90 M. Singer &: Sons, 13 Lab. Arb. 533, 536 (Arbitrator Scheiber). 
911bid. 
92 Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 49, 53 (6th Cir. 1954). 
93International Union, UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536, 541 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957). 
94 International Union, United Furniture "\Vorkers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring 
Co., 168 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1948); United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 
215 F. 2d 221, 223 (4th Cir. 1954). 
05 Lodge 12, IAM v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467, 471 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958). 
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have applied this reasoning to clauses employing wide terms in 
describing possible submissions.96 
These courts reason that "grievance" or a synonym refers to the 
daily disagreements that naturally arise where employees are gov-
erned by written contract. Every "grievance" alleges a breach of 
contract. The employer did or did not violate the agreement by 
his computation of overtime, or schedule of vacations, or subcon-
tracting of work. The critical difference between these "breaches" 
and strikes in violation of the agreement is that these "breaches" 
are contemplated. The grievance procedure is there to let employ-
ees and the union prove them. A strike in violation of contract, 
however, ruptures the entire agreement - especially that part of it 
designed to settle "breaches" peacefully. 
The Second97 Circuit at one time disagreed; the Third98 still 
does. These decisions are not based upon an analysis of "grievance" 
and what it means, but rather upon a generous endorsement of arbi-
tration; the arbitrator, and not the court, determines what "griev-
ance" means. 
2. A strike in breach of contract is a repudiation of an agree-
ment to arbitrate. The Fourth,99 Six.th,1°° First101 and Seventh102 
96 Benton Harbor: "shall difference arise . • • as to the meaning and application of 
this Agreement, or should any local trouble arise .••. " 242 F.2d at 538. 
Miller Metal Products: "all differences, disputes and grievances that may arise between 
the parties to this contract with respect to the matters covered in this agreement. • • ." 
215 F.2d at 223. 
97 Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), 
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957). It is impossible to reconcile the theories of Signal-Stat 
and Markel Elec. Prods., Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1953). Signal• 
Stat is based on a broad philosophical encouragement of arbitration; it was decided by 
Judges Clark, Frank, and Hincks. Markel, in which Judge Clark dissented, is based on a 
close reading of the agreement; it was decided by Judges Swan and Chase. The scope of 
arbitration agreement was equally broad in both. The Circuit has recently returned to 
the Markel reasoning in Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Union, 47 
L.R.R.M. 2612 (2d Cir., Feb. 17, 1961) CTudges Lumbard, Swan, Moore). 
98 Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953), on remand, 
174 F. Supp. 878 (D.N.J. 1959). 
99 See the cases cited in note 94 supra. The scholarly and precise analysis of Judge 
Parker in Colonial Hardwood merits careful study by all interested in this area. 
100 See notes 93 and 96 supra. 
101 W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 
1955), afj'd, 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 352 U.S. 
802 (1956). For companion litigation, see W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954), denying a temporary injunction for breach of the 
same no-strike clause giving rise to the damage action. 
The arbitration and grievance procedures in cases applying the principle that a strike 
in breach of contract is a repudiation of an agreement to arbitrate are quite broad. The 
Benton Harbor and Miller Metal Products clauses are quoted in note 96 supra; the Mead 
clause is even broader: "should any dispute, grievance or complaint arise during the life 
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Circuits are fond of this theory. It is based upon considerations 
of fairness. Arbitration provides the union a swift way to remedy 
"breaches" of the agreement by the employer. A strike in breach 
of contract is diametrically opposed to settlement of the dispute by 
arbitration. The union has the right peacefully to challenge the 
employer's decision within the plant; it should not simultaneously 
bring additional pressure from without. The union has elected to 
strike, not arbitrate. It does not get two bites at the apple. The 
point is articulated by the Seventh Circuit: 
"The Unions chose to act suddenly and without warning 
in using the economic force or pressure of a sit do,vn strike. 
Obviously, a chief purpose of the arbitration agreement was 
to avoid a strike. When the Unions embarked upon the strike 
they voluntarily by-passed arbitration. When they struck the 
wrong was done and the damage to plaintiff [employer] began. 
Then it was that plaintiff's right of action for damages and 
injunctive relief to prevent further damage accrued."103 
I think the Supreme Court will agree. In Warrior the Court said 
grievance arbitration is "the substitute for industrial strife."104 
And it is possible the Supreme Court has already accepted this view 
this term. Prior to Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.105 the circuits 
split over the meaning of a labor agreement with an extremely 
broad arbitration clause but with no prohibition on strikes. The 
First,106 Fourth107 and Sixth108 Circuits reasoned that a promise 
by the union to submit all conflicts with the employer to arbitra-
tion was an implied no-strike clause. The NLRB agreed.109 When 
the union struck over an issue it did not submit to arbitration it 
violated the implied no-strike clause. The employer could then 
of this agreement •.• the dispute, grievance or complaint shall be referred to the arbitra-
tion panel. ••• " 217 F.2d at 7. See also W. L. Mead, Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1955), where 
the NLRB agreed with the First Circuit's construction of this clause. 
102 Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union, 235 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956). There is strong indication in this decision that the unions 
forfeited their right to arbitrate the issue giving rise to the strike because they chose the 
strike to resolve it. 235 F.2d at 112. 
103 Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union, supra note 102, at 111. 
104 363 U.S. at 578. (Emphasis added.) 
lOu 361 U.S. 459 (1960). 
100 W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 
1955), afj'd 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 352 U.S. 
802 (1956). 
107 United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
350 U.S. 847 (1955). 
108 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958), afj'd on this point by 
an equally divided Court, 361 U.S. 459 (1960). 
100 W. L. Mead, Inc., 113 NL.R.B. 1040 (1955). 
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sue for damages in the courts; he committed no unfair labor prac-
tice in firing the strikers. The rationale of these courts was that 
"the purpose of the strike was to effect a determination of the ques-
tion without an adjudication. The strike, in other words, was 
intended to be a substitute £or the arbitration procedure."110 The 
Board's reasoning was similar.111 However, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit which in a different context had refused to hold such 
an arbitration clause to be an implied no-strike pledge112 has since 
Benedict Coal reaffirmed this earlier stand.113 
The arbitration clause in Benedict Coal could hardly be broad-
er. It expressly contemplated submission of a work stoppage to 
arbitration. "[A]ny and all disputes, stoppages, suspension of work, 
and all claims, demands or actions growing therefrom . . . 
shall be . . . settled" by the grievance machinery.114 The Sixth 
Circuit read this clause as an implied no-strike clause in an opinion 
by Judge, now Justice, Potter Stewart. The Supreme Court affirmed 
by an equally-divided Court, Mr. Justice Stewart abstaining. 
Though an affirmance by an equally-divided Court imparts no 
opinion on the merits,1115 the reason for the equal division of the 
Court will undoubtedly carry weight in the minds of practitioners 
and perhaps the lower federal courts. 
The Benedict Coal reasoning makes sense. It does no violence 
to Warrior and its companion cases. Broad as the Warrior prin-
ciples are, they relate to internal disagreements between the parties. 
They do not go to a breach of the agreement that suspends the 
whole undertaking. 
3. A strike in breach of contract is not arbitrable unless the 
grievance procedure gives the employer a right to file a grievance 
with the union and process it to arbitration. This reasoning is 
expressly endorsed by the Sixth116 and Second117 Circuits, and 
various district courts.118 It is based on a close analysis of the terms 
and philosophy of a grievance procedure. 
110w. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 126 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D. 
Mass. 1954). (Emphasis added.) 
111 W. L. Mead, Inc., ll3 NL.R.B. 1040, 1043 (1955). 
112 International Union, UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 2ll (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
113 Miles Branch Coal Co. v. UMW, 47 L.R.R.M. 2423 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1961). 
114 259 F.2d at 350. 
1115 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), 59 MICH. L. REv. 447 (1961). 
116International Union, UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536, 541 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957). 
117 Markel Elec. Prods., Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435, 437 (2d Cir. 1953). 
But see the discussion in note 97 supra. 
118 Square D Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776, 782-83 (E.D. Mich. 1954); 
Bassick Co. v. Bassick Local 229, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 126 F. Supp. 777 (D. Conn. 
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Arbitration is generally the last step in a grievance procedure. 
Few are the cases which go directly to arbitration. The reasons are 
excellent. Many grievances are dropped after they are aired in the 
conferences and meetings required before arbitration. The 
heinous injury is not quite so bad after a few days; one side has 
misread the agreement; the union and the employer swap this 
grievance for that. The various steps afford "opportunity to sub-
ordinate authorities to participate and effect adjustments within 
their special competence and concern."119 Moreover, arbitration 
can be expensive. Both parties want to know the strength of their 
positions before taking them to the umpire. The best way to test 
them is at the grievance meetings. For these reasons and others 
like them, courts and arbitrators are loathe to permit arbitration 
where the grievance procedures have not been exhausted.120 They 
lead to the sensible conclusion that arbitration is no broader than 
the process which precedes it unless the parties give it original 
jurisdiction. 
Application of this reasoning shows the folly of processing 
breach of a no-strike clause through the normal route of grievances. 
Most grievance procedures begin when an employee presents his 
complaint to his immediate foreman. It would be rather peculiar 
for an employer to ask lower supervision to calculate damages 
sustained in a strike. For example, in Square D Co. v. United 
Elec. Workers,121 the union requested a stay of a damage action 
pending arbitration. It claimed the breach was arbitrable under 
a clause calling for arbitration of "all disputes." However, arbitra-
tion was the last step in a grievance procedure, and "the entire 
procedure is geared to adjust grievances of employees and ... it is 
completely silent as to any possible grievances by the employer. 
If the last paragraph, on which defendants so strongly rely, includes 
within its ambit claims by the employer for breach of contract, how 
would it proceed? It is not an employee and it would be absurd 
to suggest that it should initiate a grievance or complaint with the 
h f "122 s op oreman .... 
This reasoning seems likely to survive Warrior. Warrior states 
that a party who asserts non-arbitrability must prove it, and he can 
1954); Borg-Warner v. United Farm Equip. Workers, 22 Lab. Arb. 443 (N.D. Ill. 1954); 
Harris Hub Bed &: Spring Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 121 F. Supp. 40, 43 (M.D. Pa. 1954). 
119 SHULMAN &: CHAMBERLAIN, CAsES ON LABoR RELATIONS 6 (1949). 
120 58 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 908, 912 (1958). 
121 123 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Mich. 1954). 
122 Id. at 783. Accord, :Markel Elec. Prods., Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435, 
437 (2d Cir. 1953). 
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do so by showing an express exclusion of the issue from the 
grievance machinery. It would be difficult to imagine a more 
express exclusion than failure to allow a claimant a method to 
present his claim. After all, the agreement could easily be written 
to make the grievance machinery run both ways. Moreover, this 
is perfectly consonant with Warrior's command to the lower courts 
to read only the agreement. Whether the employer can file a 
grievance against the union is perfectly plain from the face of the 
contract. 
The result is also supported by common sense. Most employers 
do not bargain for a right to file grievances for a good and simple 
reason: they don't need to.123 Unless the employer is limited by 
contract, he runs his plant as he pleases. Certainly the Warrior 
Court recognized this. "[A]bsent a collective bargaining agree-
ment ... [ management functions] may be exercised freely except 
as limited by public law and by the willingness of employees to 
work under the particular, unilaterally imposed conditions."124 
If the union thinks the employer has misapplied the agreement, 
the grievance procedure is there to bring the employer to terms. 
A grievance procedure is written into an agreement for the union's 
use. Of course, agreements can provide a grievance procedure for 
the employer, and some do.125 But it would be foolish to presume 
its presence. 
The effect of such a presumption is perfectly exemplified by 
Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers.126 The Tenney 
Company had agreed to an extremely broad grievance procedure. 
It called for arbitration of "all differences, disputes and grievances" 
which were not settled under the procedure set forth in the agree-
ment.127 The grievance was first referred to the department 
steward and the foreman, then to the shop committee and plant 
superintendent, and then to an international representative of the 
union and a designated officer of the employer. The union struck 
in breach of its no-strike clause and the employer sued for damages. 
The union moved for a stay of the action pending arbitration. Its 
request was granted. The court conceded that the first two steps 
of the grievance procedure were hardly appropriate to determine 
123 GREGORY, LABoR AND THE LAw 494-95 (2d rev. ed. 1958). 
124 363 U.S. at 583. 
125 See article VII of the agreement between the Brooklyn Union Gas Co. and Local 
101, Transp. Workers Union, 1 CCH LAB. L. REP. [UNION CoNTRACTS &: ARBITRATION] 
11 59,911 (1960). 
126 174 F. Supp. 878 (D.N.J. 1959). 
121 Id. at 879. 
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the issue of a wildcat strike. The court felt, however, that in the 
third step of the grievance procedure the union representative and 
one from the employer could initiate the issue of responsibility and 
damages. And arbitration was desirable as a general matter. 
I believe the case was incorrectly decided. The result distorts 
a grievance procedure which left nothing to the imagination. The 
grievance procedure did not waive the first two steps if the no-
strike clause was breached. It was mandatory that any grievance 
start at the beginning, no matter how serious. The incongruity 
of Tenney and like cases128 is thrown into high relief if the Supreme 
Court finds that 301 allows equitable relief for breach of a no-strike 
clause. Then under the Tenney rule the employer, before asking 
the federal court for a restraining order, would have to seek out 
the union's international representative to present his claim that 
the union was responsible for the breach of the agreement. The 
international representative might deny all responsibility for the 
strike; he might indicate the strike would cease the moment the 
employer capitulated on the issue giving rise to the strike. He 
might not be available until next week. The dispute would 
probably go to arbitration. If the parties could agree on an arbi-
trator, a hearing might be set within seventy-two hours. 
To state the Tenney results is to answer them. They are 
ludicrous. And especially so because parties can expressly agree 
to waive the grievance procedure in dealing with a strike in breach 
of contract. They can, and they have. In Ruppert v. Egelhofer129 
the parties agreed that any breach of the broad no-strike clause 
would waive the grievance procedure. Arbitration could be had, 
and an award rendered, forty-eight hours after notification. The 
employer claimed a slowdown in breach of the agreement, the 
arbitrator "enjoined" the unions from this conduct, and the New 
York courts upheld the award. 
The solution is novel, but as a remedy for irreparable injury 
it has one special drawback. The arbitrator's award is not self-
enforcing. The Ruppert award had to go to court. I believe 
128 Lewittes &: Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); 
Annstrong-Nonvalk Rubber Corp. v. Local 283, United Rubber Workers, 167 F. Supp. 817 
(D. Conn. 1958), appeal dismissed, 269 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1959); Brady Transfer &: Storage 
Co. v. Local 710, Meat Drivers &: Helpers, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 22 CCH Lab. Cas. 
11 67,121 (N.D. Ill. 1952). 
The court's attempt to distinguish a contrary case in its own district, Structural Steel 
&: Ornamental Iron Ass'n v. Local 545, Int'l Ass'n of Bridgeworkers, 172 F. Supp. 354 
(D.N.J. 1959), is extremely unconvincing. And see Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Ameri-
can Bakery Workers, 47 L.R.R.l\f. 2612, 2615 n.8 (2d Cir., Feb. 17, 1961). 
120 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129 (1958), 58 CoLUI\I. L. REv. 908 (1958). 
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similar awards would follow the same route. The arbitrator has 
no powers of contempt; a finding that his award has been violated 
may be forced to a court decree. And all of this takes time. More-
over, a hearing before the arbitrator would probably be on the 
merits. Temporary restraining orders, or preliminary injunctions, 
are designed to end speedily irreparable injury without an ex-
tended hearing. Under federal practice the hearing on the merits 
is set down shortly after the order is signed, so that if it was wrongly 
issued, it will be quickly dissolved. 
The essential ineffectiveness of an arbitrator's injunction of a 
strike in breach of contract leads to the most important disadvan-
tage of subjecting this breach to the arbitral process. I repeat that 
the no-strike clause is the only provision in a labor agreement of 
direct benefit to the employer. No employer who thinks of the 
matter abandons by inference his right to enforce this clause in the 
most effective forum - the courts. The law should be reluctant 
to presume relinquishment of so important a right. 
V. 
It must be obvious that traditional contract doctrine has run 
a zigzag course in its application to collective labor agreements. It 
is a favored theory that these agreements are so unique that none 
but the initiate may understand them. They are said to be so 
peculiar in their structure and so singular in their application that 
none but the expert may interpret them. Collective bargaining 
agreements are odd ducks. Whether they are a third-party 
beneficiary contract, a trade agreement, or a fiduciary relation-
ship,130 they bear marked differences to familiar contracts. They 
are designed to cover many people. They are generally of short 
duration.131 The bargaining leading to their execution is com-
pelled by law.132 Sometimes their execution is attended by strikes, 
boycotts, or the good offices of politicians attending the public 
weal. They are just different enough from ordinary undertakings 
that some listen to the votary who says this undertaking is beyond 
judicial competence. 
Naturally, this reading is gratifying to the proclaimed expert. 
It gives him a license to develop the law as he goes along. Depar-
130 See generally GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 123, at 445-52; Cox, Rights Under a 
Labor Agreement, 69 HAR.v. L. REv. 601 (1956). 
131 The NLRB encourages this by holding that a collective bargaining agreement is 
not a bar to a petition for an election by a rival union for more than two years. Pacific 
Coast Ass'n of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 NL.R.B. 990 (1958). 
132 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a) (5), (b) (3) (1958). 
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ture from traditional concepts is easy to explain - the expert is 
dealing with "industrial reality." 
A great deal of this talk. is nonsense. Collective bargaining 
agreements are negotiated to bind an employer and a union. The 
law contemplates an agreement which holds both parties to their 
bargain. Section 8 (d) of the act speaks of "the negotiation of an 
agreement ... and the execution of a written contract incorporat-
ing any agreement reached .... "133 The arrangement which binds 
the parties is the same one jurisprudence has found effective for 
some years -a written contract. And in section 301, Congress 
allowed federal courts to hear suits for violation of contracts, not 
suits for violation of unique legal hybrids. 
It would be tempting to analyze the concepts of offer, accept-
ance, and consideration in light of NLRB rules of the bargaining 
practice, but this is beside the point in an article on the no-strike 
clause. "A total breach of contract is a breach whose remedial 
rights provided by law are substituted for all the existing con-
tractual rights, or can be so substituted by the injured party."134 
Clearly breach of a no-strike clause is a material breach of contract. 
It is certainly so in light of the quotation which opened this article 
and the bargaining concepts which I have already discussed. 
Because it is a material breach, a strike in violation of a no-
strike pledge immediately gives rise to several rights of action by 
the employer. 
I. The employer may treat the strike as a total breach and 
rescind the agreement. In United Elec. Workers v. NLRB135 the 
union struck in breach of contract. The employer told all em-
ployees by letter that they had been removed from the payroll; 
that all who had taken part in the strike were discharged; that the 
contract was cancelled; and that the company would no longer 
bargain ·with the union. The Board found that these acts did not 
violate the act,136 and the District of Columbia Circuit upheld this 
finding. It bottomed its reasoning on general principles of con-
tract law, citing so conventional a source as the Restatement of 
Contracts for the proposition that one party to an agreement need 
not perform if the other party refuses in a material respect to do so. 
"Moreover, in cases where the breach is a strike in viola-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement, as in the instant 
133 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1958). 
184 REsiATEMENT, CoNTRACI'S § 313 (I) (1932). 
135 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 (1956). 
136 Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1953). 
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case, application of the rule is supported by the rationale 
underlying such agreements .... A no-strike provision is 'The 
chief advantage which an employer can reasonably expect 
from a collective labor agreement.' The walkout was a mate-
rial breach which justified the subsequent rescission of the 
contract by the Company."137 
The court imposed an affirmative obligation on the participants 
of the strike to disavow their activity. All employees had received 
the employer's letter informing them of their discharge for breach 
of contract. All remained silent. By taking no steps to disavow the 
action of their agent, the union, the Board was justified in con-
cluding that the employees had acquiesced in the union's action. 
They therefore shared with the union its penalty. 
If the employer elects to rescind he cannot subsequently sue 
the union for damages. He has elected his remedy.138 Of course, 
the NLRB does not enjoin these strikes or award damages for them 
because a breach of contract, by clear congressional direction, is 
left to the courts. The Board redresses these breaches within its 
own bailiwick. It rules that the employer may discharge any or 
all employees who strike in breach of contract;139 the Board does 
not weigh relative guilt. Since the employer may discharge all 
employees who strike in breach of contract, he may pick and choose 
which of the strikers he will rehire.140 The Board also reasons that 
union leaders bear a greater responsibility to remedy breach of a 
no-strike clause; their discharge for failure to do so is not discrim-
inatory.141 Moreover, the Board suspends compulsory bargaining 
during a strike in breach of contract.142 
137 223 F.2d at 341. 
138 Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge, IAM, 91 F. Supp. 596 
(W.D. Wash. 1950), afj'd, 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1951). 
139 American Gilsonite Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1514 (1958), aff'd on reconsideration, 122 
N.L.R.B. 1006 (1959); United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949). 
140 Michigan Lumber Fabricators, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 579 (1955); see also the following 
administrative rulings of NLRB General Counsel: Case No. K-719, 39 L.R.R.l\f. 1024 (1956); 
Case No. F-854, 44 L.R.R.M. 1112 (1959); Case No. F-1095, 44 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1959). 
141 Stockham Pipe Fittings Co., 84 N .L.R.B. 629 (1949); see also the following admin-
istrative rulings of NLRB General Counsel: Case No. F-854, 44 L.R.R.M. 1112 (1959); 
Case No. F-253, 41 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1958). 
142Valley City Furniture Co., 110 NL.R.B. 1589 (1954), enforced, 230 F.2d 947 (6th 
Cir. 1956). 
It will be noted that the cases cited in notes 139-42 span two political administrations. 
Whatever the effects of a national election on the NLRB, it seems safe to predict consistent 
treatment of the no-strike clause. 
I repeat that the text oversimplifies. Section 8 (d) of the act, 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158 (d) (1958), writes into every agreement at least a sixty-day no-strike clause. See Note, 
69 YALE L.J. 309 (1959). The most obvious problem will arise when a strike breaches a 
no-strike clause and § 8 (d) as well, and the Board chooses to exercise its discretionary 
powers to ask for an injunction under § 10 (j) of the act, 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
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2. The employer may treat the strike as a partial breach, sub-
ject to an injunction or damages or both. He may ask the state 
courts to enjoin the strike or award damages under section 301 or 
state common law.143 It is the thesis of this article that he should 
be able to follow a similar course in the federal courts under 30 I. 
There is nothing strange in these principles. Their result is 
just. Judges should demand more than the predilections of an 
expert as reason for scrapping them. Indeed, departure from these 
principles produces bizarre results. Consider Mastro Plastics Corp. 
v. NLRB.144 That case is said to mean that a union is privileged 
to strike in violation of a no-strike clause when the strike is in 
protest of an employer's unfair labor practices. The Mastro Plastics 
unfair labor practices were many and serious. The employer, favor-
ing one union over another, gave every form of assistance to the 
favored union, including the discharge of some seventy-seven em-
ployees who refused to join the union the employer preferred. 
The Board,145 the Second Circuit,146 and the Supreme Court147 
held that a strike over these unfair labor practices was protected 
activity, in spite of the presence of the no-strike clause. They 
ordered reinstatement of strikers discharged for violation of con-
tract. Professor Cox has aptly remarked that traditional contract 
principles would have produced the same result without the tor-
tured reasoning employed by all three forums.148 The law implies 
in every agreement a covenant of good faith that neither party will 
attempt to destroy the existence of the other, thereby preventing 
fulfillment of the agreement. When Mastro Plastics attempted to 
destroy the identity of the union with which it had an agreement 
by discharging seventy-seven of its members, it violated the prom-
§ 160 G) (1958). The short answer to this is probably that the NLRB is not the only forum 
capable of effectuating a national labor policy. The district court hearing a petition by an 
employer for an order restraining breach of a no-strike clause could grant the relief 
pending an appearance by the Board (certain to be delayed). One court has already 
denied a motion to stay a damage action for breach of a no-strike clause and a jurisdic-
tional dispute governed by § 8 (b) (4) (D). L. R. Young Constr. Co. v. United Ass'n of 
Journeymen, 33 CCH Lab. Cas. ,i 70,932 (E.D. Ill. 1957). Even if the reader were patient, 
there is neither time nor space to develop these and related problems. 
143 Under § 301: Mccarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 
2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). 
Under common law: General Elec. Co. v. International Union, UA W-CIO, 93 Ohio 
App. 139, 108 N.E.2d 211 (1952), appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 555, 110 N.E.2d 424 (1953). 
144 350 U.S. 270 (1956). 
145 Mastro Plastics Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953). 
146 214 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954). 
147 350 U.S. 270 (1956). 
148 Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. I, 
16-19 (1958). 
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ise of good faith implicit in every agreement. This was a material 
breach of contract. The union was privileged to elect non-perform-
ance of its obligation. Hardly a momentous result. It scarcely 
warrants the Court's statement that only an express reservation 
in the no-strike clause would hold it operative in the face of em-
ployer unfair labor practices. 
It is one thing to discharge seventy-seven members who re-
fuse to join the union an employer chooses; it is quite another 
to discharge but one man. In Mid-West Metallic Products, Inc.,149 
the employer discriminately discharged an employee one day. His 
action prompted a strike in breach of a no-strike clause the next. 
The employer discharged various strikers. The trial examiner, 
after finding the initial discharge unlawful, concluded that the 
remaining strikers protested an unfair labor practice, justifying 
their action. All discharges violated section 8 (a) (3). The Board 
agreed the discharge which started it all was unlawful; the other 
discharges were not. But to rationalize this result with Mastro 
Plastics is to put the square peg in a round hole. The Board noted 
that the union had a perfectly ample way to remedy the discharge 
in the grievance procedure, particularly since the grievance pro-
cedure required discharge cases to be processed in approximately 
five days. The Board concluded that "unlike the union in the 
Mastro Plastics case, the instant union did not jeopardize its very 
existence by renouncing self-help against unfair labor practices for 
a substantial period of time."150 The difficulty with this is that 
Mastro Plastics too had a grievance procedure-an extremely broad 
one.151 The real reason, of course, is that the single unfair labor 
practice in Mid-West Metallic was minor compared to those in 
Mastro Plastics. 
Had the Board resorted to classic contract doctrine it could 
easily have achieved the same result without its labored reasoning. 
Not every breach of contract is a material breach which justifies 
non-performance by the other party. If the agreement is partially 
breached, then the wronged party seeks legal relief or, in this case, 
the relief provided by contract. He is not privileged to rescind his 
agreement unless the corresponding breach is material. Therefore, 
in Mid-West Metallic Products, the Board could easily have rea-
soned that the discharge, albeit discriminatory, was a partial breach 
of contract. The union was entitled to pursue the grievance pro-
149121 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1958). 
150 Id. at 1320. 
151103 NL.R.B. at 514-15. 
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cedure and, if necessary, legal and equitable remedies. But the 
breach was not such as to permit the union to avoid its undertaking 
altogether. The agreement remained in effect and so did all of its 
pertinent clauses. 
Consider the reverse. Suppose a union threatens a new em-
ployee with loss of his job if he does not join the union in five days. 
The agreement - and the law - give the employee thirty days. 
The union has breached its agreement; it has also committed an 
unfair labor practice.152 Yet no court would allow the employer to 
rescind. Why? The breach is not material. 
The point of all this is to emphasize the validity of conven-
tional contract principles in analyzing breach of a no-strike clause. 
Courts understand these principles. They are especially competent 
to apply them. Moreover, these principles have served society well 
for a number of years. They should hardly be discarded because 
an industrial system provides new challenges to a traditional theory. 
The ability of the common law to meet fresh tests is one of its finest 
qualities. It doubtless prompted Mr. Justice Frankfurter to say: 
"There is no reason for jettisoning principles of fairness 
and justice that are as relevant to the law's attitude in the en-
forcement of collective bargaining agreements as they are to 
contracts dealing with other affairs, even giving due regard to 
the circumstances of industrial life and to the libretto that this 
furnishes in construing collective bargaining agreements. "153 
VI. 
One irony - at least - emerges from Lincoln Mills and War-
rior. These decisions bring judges and lawyers back to an area 
where for years the experts said they had no place. This is ines-
capable. Both cases present no mean problems in draftsmanship. 
It is likely lawyers will do the drafting. And federal judges will 
have to review their efforts. 
Some will ·wring their hands over the appearance of the law on 
sacrosanct land. I think their alarm illusory. The collective bar-
gaining agreement has come of age. Its breach no longer needs the 
care of a hothouse rose. Whatever may be said for solution of in-
ternal breaches of the agreement by expertise, external breaches 
can and should be subject to traditional remedies that have worked 
so well in the past. Of course, any private individual can "award" 
152 Local 404, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 100 N.L.R.B. 801, Sll (1952). 
153 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 475-76 (1960) (dissenting opinion). 
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specific performance, damages, reformation, and rescission. The 
difference is that courts can make them stick. And courts have 
applied these remedies for years: to A's refusal to deliver his horse 
to B as agreed, or to make X deliver two million dollars in products 
to Y. These remedies have been applied by courts to breach of 
contracts as vital to the signatories as any labor agreement. These 
remedies are strict, and sometimes harsh, but they provide a foun-
dation of respect for contracts an advanced society can hardly do 
without. It is time they were equally applied to breach of labor 
agreements. The forum to apply them is the court, for, as one 
arbitrator has observed, "damages for strikes and lockouts in vio-
lation of the contract is a remedy normal to the courts - but not 
to arbitration. When parties seek such extra-arbitral remedy, the 
proper tribunal is, and has been, the courts - unless the contract 
specifically authorizes the arbitrator to invoke such a remedy .... "1114 
Too much has been said of the dissimilarity of labor agreements 
to ordinary contracts. Yet in one respect the collective labor agree-
ment is vastly different from any other undertaking, and on this 
difference the commentators are curiously silent. The labor agree-
ment has a political importance that attaches to no other under-
taking. Its negotiation is often trumpeted in the press. One side 
or the other appeals for sympathy - and pressure - to anyone it 
feels favorable - civic leaders, professors, the clergy. It is often the 
result of a long and violent strike. Perhaps for this reason above all 
Congress gave a non-elected judiciary the jurisdiction to hear suits 
for their violation. It was a sensible choice. Naturally, federal 
judges bring their disposition and capacities to the bench with 
them. But more than any other, a federal judge is free from the 
elective pressures that sway labor agencies and some state courts. 
He has tenure for life and good behavior; he is adequately paid. 
Unlike an arbitrator, he cannot be dismissed after an unfavorable 
award. His job does not depend on the whim of anyone. He is the 
ideal person to shape the law of breach of the labor agreement. 
154 Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. 1061, 1064 (Arbitrator Crawford). 
